Bargaining Theory and Fairness

A Theoretical and Experimental Approach Considering Freedom of Choice and the Crowding-out of Intrinsic Motivation

2002. Tab., Abb.; 174 S.
Available as
56,00 €
ISBN 978-3-428-10741-4
49,90 €
ISBN 978-3-428-50741-2
Price for libraries: 64,00 € [?]
67,90 €
ISBN 978-3-428-80741-3
Price for libraries: 86,00 € [?]


Two new bargaining games, called "Freedom to Punish (FTP)" and "Right and Choice to Punish (RAP)", are developed, analyzed and tested by means of an experimental implementation. Hypotheses about behavior are developed, discussed and tested. The central hypotheses are aimed at the importance of freedom of choice, on the difference between the FTP game and the RAP game, and on the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. As might have been expected, fairness plays a role in both games, represented by the frequent appearances of equal splits as well as by the frequent rejections of unfair offers.

In addition to that, fairness was crowded out by the new Institution of a veto power decision, confirming the importance of the institutional setting for behavior. Contrary to the few veto power sales in the RAP game, an amazingly high number of receivers refrained from veto power in the FTP game. This significant difference has clearly been attributed to the different information conditions and the existence of a bonus. This bonus can be interpreted in terms of freedom of choice, and exploits a value for the freedom to choose for the first time in experimental economics.


Inhaltsübersicht: A. Introduction: Motivation and Research Objectives - Overview and Contents - B. Research on Bargaining Games: Bargaining Games and Related Games - Comparisons Between Related Types of Games - A Summary of Research Results - C. Fairness and Intrinsic Motivation: The Concept of Intrinsic Motivation - Experimental Approaches Towards Intrinsic Motivation - Aspects of Fairness - Referring to a Fairness Norm - Relevant Factors for a Social Norm of Fairness - Another Implementation of Fairness - Putting the Factors Together - D. Freedom of Choice: The Basic Concept - Axiomatic Modeling of Freedom of Choice - Modeling Freedom of Choice with a Simple Game - A Summary on Freedom of Choice - E. The Two Games and Their Experimental Realization: Freedom to Punish - Right and Choice to Punish - Differences and Similarities Between the Two Games - The Experimental Realization - The Experimental Procedure - F. Experimental Design for the FTP Game: Design Approach for the Experiment - Alternative Designs - G. Experimental Results for the FTP Game: An Overview of the Decisions in the FTP Game - Design Background and Hypothesis Approach - Statistical Analysis for the FTP Game - General Results of the FTP Game - H. Experimental Design for the RAP Game: Design Approach for the Experiment - Alternative Designs - I. Experimental Results for the RAP Game: An Overview of the Decisions in the RAP Game - Design Background and Hypothesis Approach - Statistical Analysis for the RAP Game - General Results of the RAP Game - J. Summary - Bibliography - Subject Index

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